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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses private party participation in the WTO dispute resolution system. 
Notwithstanding the rule-oriented reform of the WTO, there are many improvements that can be 
made to the WTO dispute resolution system. The lack of standing for private parties to raise a 
claim before the WTO dispute resolution system means there are many potential international 
trade dispute claims that are never resolved. Private counsel representation and submission of 
amicus brief by private parties acknowledge that WTO are realizing the efficacy of private 
interests in international trade matters. These changes, however, are not sufficient for private 
parties to protect their interests unless the ability to initiate dispute before the WTO is granted to 
them without the aid of a member state. Standing should be strictly limited to those parties that 
have suffered actual harm to reduce the number of frivolous suits. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organization (WTO), which officially came into existence on January 1, 
1995, was the culmination of trade negotiations that had lasted nearly a decade.1  With the 
WTO’s creation, new trade agreements were made which reduced tariffs and other trade barriers 
to lower levels than ever before.2  As the first international organization with the responsibility 
of overseeing the world trading system3 and more than 140 member states,4 the WTO system 
applies to over $6 trillion, or about 90 percent, of international trade in goods and service per 
year.5  
One of the most significant changes made by the WTO was the creation of a new procedure 
for resolving trade disputes.  Because of the peculiar history6 of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade7 (GATT), the GATT dispute resolution system was primarily developed in an 
ad hoc, disorganized fashion.  As a result, the system was extremely susceptible to political 
                                            
1 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Charter]. 
2 See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 295, 296 (1996) [hereinafter Nichols, Extension of Standing]. 
3 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE LAUNCH OF THE WTO: SIGNIFICANCE & CHALLENGES, IN 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. 
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 5, 10- 11 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996) [hereinafter JACKSON, URUGUAY ROUND]. 
4 See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Current WTO members (As of February 25, 2004, 146 
states, including most of the industrialized world, were members of the WTO.), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm. 
5 JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH, 
779 (2002). 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 23-48. 
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
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 gamesmanship and diplomatic power struggles among states.  The outcomes of trade disputes 
were affected by the unpredictability of international relations, instead of a fair and impartial 
interpretation of the underlying treaties.8 
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,9 an 
annex to the WTO Charter, made a major improvement over the GATT dispute resolution system.  
It greatly diminished the ability of large states to use their power to derail the dispute resolution 
process and advanced the WTO’s stated goal of “providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system.”10  Under the WTO system, the outcome of trade disputes is less 
dependent on the power of the states involved and more dependent on a fair and logical 
application of the trade agreements. 
The WTO dispute resolution system is so important that the former Director General has 
called it “the central pillar of the multilateral trading system and the WTO’s most individual 
contributions to the stability of the global economy.”11  It differs not only from dispute handling 
within the GATT, but in fact from most previous dispute settlement mechanisms at an 
international level in that it has moved from the traditional power based dispute resolution 
toward the new rule based dispute resolution.12  Since its operation, the WTO dispute resolution 
                                            
8 Glen T. Schleyer, Power to The People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims before The WTO Dispute 
Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2276 (April, 1997). 
9 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Final Act Embodying the Results 
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding]. 
10 Id. art. 3(2). 
11 Former Director General Renato Ruggiero, WTO News: 1995-99 Speeches, Address to the Korean Business 
Association, (Apr. 17, 1997) (transcript available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sprr_e/seoul_e.htm). 
12 Lawrence D. Roberts, Beyond Notions of Diplomacy and Legalism: Building a Just Mechanism for WTO Dispute 
Resolution, 40 AM.BUS.L.J. 511, 512 (Spring 2003). 
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 system has been very busy; more than 80 cases were filed in the first two years and more than 
300 cases had been filed up to now.13 
Notwithstanding its success, however, the WTO dispute resolution system has been 
criticized for its inability to reflect the needs and concerns of the citizens of WTO member states 
because it does not allow private parties to seek resolution of international trade disputes.  Also, 
political motivations and diplomatic gamesmanship can still exist in the WTO dispute resolution 
system14 because the WTO provision allows only states to challenge illegal trade practices.15  
Under the WTO dispute resolution system, the initial filing of a dispute and its continuation are 
affected by political motivations and international relations, instead of the merits of a claim.  No 
matter how serious a trade violation is, the illicit trade policy will continue if no government is 
willing to take the political risk associated with initiating a dispute. 
Under the WTO dispute resolution system, private parties must rely on their governments to 
assert and defend their trading rights.  This approach disregards the fact that companies and 
individuals are the primary and real actors in international trade and are directly affected by the 
decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.16  The lack of rights and standing for private 
actors makes the system less responsive to the citizen of member states and less democratic in 
                                            
13 Dispute Chronologically, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm. 
14 For example, the United States successfully pressured the European Union to drop the case where the validity of 
the Helms-Burton Act was alleged, See David E. Sanger, Europe Postpones Challenge to U.S. on Havana Trade, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1997, at A1. 
15 See Understanding, supra note 9, art. 3. 
16 See SUSAN STRANGE, STATES, FIRMS, AND DIPLOMACY, INT’L AFFAIRS, London, Vol. 68, no.1, (1992). 
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 the end.  Therefore, the legitimacy of the WTO dispute resolution system, which does not allow 
access to such key players in international trade, has been questioned.17 
If private parties could initiate disputes over the legitimacy of a state’s actions, then a ruling 
on the merits would be virtually assured.  Private parties would not be susceptible to political 
pressures in the same way as states.  Also private parties’ claims would not hurt international 
relations because the claims could not be considered as a diplomatic attack or maneuver.18 
Despite the importance of states in international law, the notion that only states enjoy rights 
and duties directly under international law does not really correspond with the way non-state 
actors and states interact because.19  Private parties are the primary and real actors in world 
trade today, and it is their investments and efforts that are harmed by illicit trade policies.  
Global compliance with trade agreements is essential if the people of the world are to fully reap 
the economic benefits of free trade.  The only adequate way to ensure global compliance and 
advance the WTO’s goal of providing more stability and predictability to international trade is to 
give private parties, not just states, the right to participate in the WTO dispute resolution system. 
Since its creation, the WTO has moved slowly in the direction to private party participation 
in its dispute resolution system.  The WTO Appellate Body has asserted the right of member 
states to include private, non-governmental employees in their trade delegations before the 
WTO,20 and has acknowledged the right of private individuals or organizations to submit amicus 
                                            
17 See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade 
Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 359 (1996) [hereinafter Shell, Trade Stakeholders Model]. 
18 Schleyer, supra note 8, at 2277. 
19 See DUNOFF, supra note 5, at 191. 
20 See WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sep. 9, 1997) [hereinafter EU-Bananas]. 
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 briefs in support of their positions in international trade disputes.21  These decisions suggest that 
dispute resolution in the WTO may be changing from a solely governmental focus to a broader 
one.   
Part II of this paper discusses the background of both the GATT and the WTO.  This part 
examines the formation, history, and philosophy of both the GATT and the WTO, with an 
emphasis on their respective dispute resolution systems.  Part III summarizes the competing 
political philosophies regarding the development of world trade dispute resolution over the past 
fifty years.  After reviewing the arguments surrounding the extension of private participation in 
the WTO dispute resolution system, this part discusses the benefits that greater private 
participation would confer upon the WTO dispute resolution system.  Part IV examines how 
private parties can participate in the current WTO dispute resolution system.  This part reviews 
whether the WTO Appellate Body decisions are adequate enough to protect private parties’ 
interests and to achieve WTO objectives.  Part V examines other possible ways for enhancing 
private participation in the WTO.  After discussing other international tribunals that allow 
private parties to bring suit against a state, this part tries to find the method which is appropriate 
to the WTO dispute resolution system.  Finally, Part VI, the conclusion of this paper, examines 
whether future concessions permitting further private party access to the WTO can be expected 
to the extent that private parties can bring trade disputes before the WTO dispute resolution 
system. 
                                            
21 See WTO Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, at 15-22 
(holding that amicus briefs may now be sent directly to the WTO without attachment to members' submissions). 
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtles]. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The current world trade system has its roots in the years immediately following World War 
II, when Western states agreed that international trade frameworks were necessary to support 
individual national economies and the global economy as a whole, and reduce the possibility of 
another massive armed conflict.22  An analysis of the history and development of the two major 
entities governing world trade, the GATT and the WTO, will help to understand the problems 
surrounding the GATT and the WTO dispute resolution systems. 
A. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
The GATT was originally negotiated in 1947 by twenty-three countries23 as a provisional 
trade agreement to lower tariffs in conjunction with the establishment of three global economic 
institutions: the International Trade Organization (ITO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).24  This subpart 
of the thesis deals with the development and major characteristics of the GATT, as well as the 
attributes, advantages, and drawbacks of the GATT dispute resolution system. 
                                            
22 Roberts, supra note 12, at 513. 
23 JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 5 (1990). 
24 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
31-37 (1989) [hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]. 
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 1. Development of the GATT 
The international trade system that emerged after World War II was a part of a new and 
broader conception of the international economic order expressed by the Bretton Woods 
Agreements.  In June of 1944, representatives of the Allied states met in Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire.25  Near the end of World War II, these states recognized the need to address the 
financial and economic problems that had contributed to the Great Depression and World War 
II.26   Because the Bretton Woods participants were from the finance ministries of their 
respective governments, they had established the charters of two major international financial 
entities at the end of the Conference - the IMF and the World Bank.27 
The Bretton Woods participants also recognized the need for a third international 
organization which would supervise the area of world trade.28  The protectionist measures that 
had arisen during the two decades between the World Wars had hampered international trade, and 
most states felt that this obstruction of free trade was a major factor contributing to the 
Depression and the War.29  Shortly after the Bretton Woods Conference, the United States and 
                                            
25 Representatives of 44 states participated in the Bretton Woods Conference. Richard Myrus, Note, From Bretton 
Woods to Brussels: A Legal Analysis of the Exchange-Rate Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund and 
the European Community, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2095, 2096-97 (1994). 
26 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24. 
27 Id. at 31-32. 
28 WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 5; Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 388 (1996) 
[hereinafter Nichols, GATT Doctrine]. 
29 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 31; Muquel Montana i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law 
Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 106-07 
(1993). 
 7 
 
 the United Kingdom proposed the creation of the ITO.30  The newly-formed United Nations 
was charged with the task of creating a charter for the ITO.31 
The states participating in this unprecedented multinational effort, however, were eager to 
enjoy the benefits of free trade and did not want to wait for the creation of the ITO.32  As an 
interim measure, they decided to draft and enter into a multilateral trade agreement that would 
regulate international trade until the ITO could take over.33 This provisional arrangement was 
the GATT, and in 1947 the participating states signed a Protocol of Provisional Application, 
which put the GATT into force.34  
In the meantime, the ITO was running into problems.  The proposed charter for the ITO 
was extremely ambitious and set numerous limits on the actions that participating states could 
take in international trade.35  As a result, in 1950, the United States Congress, refused to ratify 
the ITO charter because of “perceived threats to national sovereignty and the danger of too much 
ITO intervention in markets.” 36   Without U.S. participation, the ITO never came into 
existence,37 leaving the GATT as the legal structure within which world trade policies would be 
                                            
30 Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 389. 
31 WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 5; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 389. 
32 Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 389. 
33 WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 5-6; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 389. 
34 GATT, supra note 7. The states signing the GATT were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, 
Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. 
35 JACKSON, URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3, at 6. 
36 Michael R. Czinkita, Executive Insights: The World Trade Organization - Perspectives and Prospects, 3 J. INT’L 
MARKETING 85 (1995). 
37 “Because the support of the United States was critical, other countries that were ready to adopt the ITO charter 
waited to see its fate in the United State. President Truman submitted the ITO charter to Congress, but the 
Republicans won control of Congress in the 1948 election. In 1950, the Truman administration announced that it 
would no longer seek congressional approval for the ITO,” MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 2 (2003). 
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 developed.38  The demise of the ITO meant, among other things, abandoning the ITO’s 
consensus-based dispute resolution system, which included resort to the International Court of 
Justice for “advisory opinions”39 and a binding arbitration option outside the ITO for disputing 
ITO members.40   
As a result, the GATT, which was intended to be merely temporary, became by default the 
primary entity governing international trade41 with a number of procedural weaknesses.42  The 
mismatch between the GATT’s initial conception and its ultimate function manifested itself in a 
number of ways, including the artificial “leasing” of its staff from the non-existent ITO43 and the 
lack of any guiding constitution or charter.44 
The “birth defect” of the GATT raised the concern that it would not survive the contentious 
nature of international trade.45  The GATT, however, proved tremendously beneficial to world 
trade over the next fifty years.46  Most importantly, the GATT functioned as the basis of 
                                            
38 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 15. The GATT took legal effect through the “Protocol of 
Provisional Application,” under which GATT is applied as a treaty obligation under international law. Id. at 13-14. 
The Protocol permitted the executive branches of the signing states to implement the GATT without seeking 
legislative approval by giving “grandfather rights” to trade legislation existing in 1947 that was inconsistent with the 
GATT. Id. at 14. These grandfather rights exist to the present day. Id. 
39 ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM & WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 28-30 (2d ed. 1990). 
40 Id. at 31 n.18. The ITO Charter provided that such arbitration decisions “shall not be binding for any purpose on 
the Organization.” (quoting ITO CHARTER art. 93(2)). 
41 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 37; WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 6; Nichols, GATT 
Doctrine, supra note 28, at 390. 
42 Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 390. 
43 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 37. 
44 Id. at 38. 
45 G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade 
Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 833 (1995) [hereinafter Shell, Trade Legalism]. 
46 WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 6. 
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 ongoing trade negotiations, called “trade rounds,” which resulted in diminished tariffs.47  In 
time, the GATT eventually became a de facto international organization.48 
2. Obligations Imposed by the GATT 
The GATT’s drafters intended it to be instrumental in combating the high tariffs and other 
protectionist measures that had contributed to the Great Depression and World War II.49  To this 
end, Article II of the GATT prohibits the participating states, called “Contracting Parties,” from 
imposing any import restrictions other than tariffs and also limits the tariffs that can be 
imposed. 50   Between the adoption of the GATT and its replacement by the WTO, the 
Contracting Parties repeatedly lowered the tariff limits referred to in Article II.51  Eventually, 
the tariffs reached such low levels as to present no real impediment to free trade.52 
In addition to the tariff reductions, the GATT also places limits on the internal laws and 
regulations of the Contracting Parties. Specifically, each state’s treatment of imports from 
another Contracting Party must satisfy two principles of non-discriminatory treatment set forth 
                                            
47 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 52-3; Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the 
“Rule of Law,” 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1020 (1985). 
48 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 38. 
49 Id. at 31. In the Preamble to the GATT, the Contracting Parties manifested their desire to “enter[ ] into reciprocal 
and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade 
and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.” GATT, supra note 7, Preamble. 
50 GATT, supra note 7, art. II; JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 115, 118-19. 
51 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 52-3. 
52 See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 53; see also Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, 
at 387 (noting that the Contracting Parties anticipated that tariff limits “were to be negotiated down so that 
eventually trade among states would be virtually unfettered”). 
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 by the GATT.  These are referred to as “most-favored-nation treatment”53 and “national 
treatment.”54  
Article I of the GATT sets forth the most-favored-nation obligation.55  Under this article, 
one Contracting Party cannot be given preferential treatment over another country.  Instead, the 
imports from, and exports to, each Contracting Party must be afforded equitable treatment with 
respect to customs procedures and all other import- or export-related regulations.  In effect, 
each state must “grant to every other contracting party the most favorable treatment that it grants 
to any country.”56 
The second type of non-discrimination is national treatment, set forth in Article III of the 
GATT.57  Under this doctrine, the domestic laws of a Contracting Party must treat goods 
imported from another Contracting Party no less favorably than comparable domestically-
produced goods once the goods have entered the domestic market.58 
3. GATT Dispute Resolution 
The provisional nature of the GATT shaped its dispute resolution processes, which began as 
a diplomatic system of dispute settlement and gradually evolved into a rule-oriented but formally 
nonbinding arbitration scheme.  From its inception, the development of dispute resolution 
mechanisms under the GATT was influenced by the tension between those states desiring a more 
                                            
53 GATT, supra note 7, art. I. 
54 Id. art. III. 
55 Id. art. I(1). 
56 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 133; GATT, supra note 7, art. I(1). 
57 GATT, supra note 7, art. III(1)-(2). 
58 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 189; GATT, supra note 7, art. III(1)-(2). 
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 flexible, negotiation based dispute resolution and those states preferring a rule based dispute 
resolution with clear written standards.59  The provisional nature of the initial agreement 
strongly advanced the position of advocates of the diplomatic approach, at least at the outset.60  
As negotiated in 1947, GATT contained only a few paragraphs devoted to dispute settlement.  
Articles XXII61 and XXIII62 provide only the most cursory guidance for the contracting parties.   
The GATT dispute resolution system is triggered when a Contracting Party determines that 
a benefit accruing to it under the GATT is being “nullified or impaired” by the actions of another 
Contracting Party.63  The GATT requires the states involved to try to resolve the dispute 
between themselves before bringing the dispute to the other Contracting Parties.  The first step 
the complaining state must take is to “make written representations or proposals” to the state it 
believes to be acting in contravention of the GATT.64  The other state must “give sympathetic 
consideration” to these representations and proposals.65 
If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute themselves, Article XXIII allows the 
complaining party to bring the complaint before the other Contracting Parties, who will 
investigate and make appropriate recommendations.66  In the early years of the GATT, disputes 
                                            
59 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
454 (2000). 
60 The GATT always suffered from birth defect, inherent weakness that handicapped its operation. See JOHN. H. 
JACKSON, DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT, APPRAISAL AND PROSPECTS, IN THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 161, 163 (Anne O. 
Krueger ed., 1998). 
61 GATT, supra note 7, art. XXII. 
62 Id. art. XXIII. 
63 GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII(1); JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 94; Nichols, GATT 
Doctrine, supra note 28, at 392. 
64 GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII(1). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. art. XXIII(2). 
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 were taken up at a meeting of all the Contracting Parties.67  Because this proved too inefficient 
and time-consuming for most disputes, the Contracting Parties developed an alternate method, 
under which a working party would investigate the dispute and make a recommendation.68  The 
working party generally consisted of representatives of the disputing countries and of a few 
neutral countries.69 
In 1955, however, the GATT Secretariat established dispute resolution panels of three to 
five experts to act as independent arbitrators to facilitate dispute resolution.  The GATT used 
this general arbitration framework for dispute resolution until the WTO came into existence in 
1995.70  Between 1955 and 1995, the GATT system gradually grew more legalistic and 
professional, but it remained formally non-binding.71 
The GATT dispute resolution system worked remarkably well in its early years because 
compliance with the system was the norm due to “the homogeneity of the initial contracting 
parties and the consensus in support of the GATT rules.”72  In the 1950s and 1960s, however, as 
more states became Contracting Parties, this policy cohesion faltered, and the “decision-making 
process became more cumbersome.”73 
The GATT dispute resolution system had a number of features that, over time, proved 
problematic.  The allegedly noncomplying state had a right of veto at virtually every step of the 
                                            
67 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 95; see Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 393. 
68 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 95; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 393-94. 
69 Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 393-94. 
70 Id. 
71 For a general description of the various modifications in panel procedures that have been implemented since 1955, 
see JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 23, at 61-65. 
72 Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 108; see Robert E. Hudec, supra note 39, at 190. 
73 Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 108; see Hudec, supra note 39, at 193. 
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 process, from the appointment of a panel, to the decision to adopt a panel report, and to a 
decision to authorize trade sanctions in response to noncompliance.74  Moreover, there were no 
set time periods for the various states of the process, giving the defending state the ability to 
delay the proceedings.75 
Most importantly, because the GATT system relied heavily on consensus76 in rendering 
decisions, those states against which complaints were filed could readily obstruct the process and 
make enforcement of any panel recommendations virtually non-existent.77  The consensus 
requirement for adopting panel decisions meant that one party could block the decision by voting 
against it.  Therefore, the losing state could effectively veto any legal effect of the 
recommendation.  Consequently, only one panel decision resulted in the authorization of 
retaliation by the Contracting Parties in the entire history of the GATT.78  Even in this case, 
which came from a complaint by the Netherlands against the United States, 79  political 
considerations forestalled application of the authorized retaliation, and the initial trade violation 
continued unabated.80  Another political outcome of the consensus requirement was that 
                                            
74 DUNOFF, supra note 5, at 781. 
75 Id. 
76 The concept of consensus was never formally defined under the GATT. It retains characteristics similar to 
unanimity in that any state member present has a veto authority. Consensus is unaffected by abstentions or absence. 
Norio Komuro, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Coverage and Procedures of the WTO Understanding, 12 
J. INT'L ARB. 81, 105-06 (1995). 
77 Roberts, supra note 12, at 516. 
78 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 96; Shell, Trade Stakeholders Model, supra note 17, at 
365. 
79 In 1953, the Netherlands raised a complaint about U.S. restraints on imported dairy products. The Contracting 
Parties authorized the Netherlands to retaliate by limiting U.S. grain imports. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 
supra note 24, at 96. 
80 Id. 
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 countries “occasionally withheld approval of a panel report in retaliation for some country’s 
unwillingness to allow adoption of a panel report favorable to the first country.”81 
In response to the growing ineffectiveness of the dispute resolution system, states relied 
increasingly on unilateral threats and trade sanctions to resolve their trade-related differences.82  
The United States was particularly eager to resort to unilateral measures.83  The use of section 
301 as a unilateral trade weapon84 against foreign governments and industries outside the legal 
framework of the GATT upset many U.S. trading partners85 and became a major issue in the 
Uruguay Round.86  As it became clear that section 301 was a target for foreign trade negotiators, 
Congress announced that the weak GATT dispute resolution system made section 301 a necessity 
and that no revisions of section 301 could be expected unless there were major changes in the 
dispute resolution process.87  Thus, when the Contracting Parties met in the mid-1980s to 
overhaul the international trade system, the growing impotence of the GATT dispute resolution 
process was a major issue to be solved.88 
                                            
81 Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 
389, 402 (1995). 
82 Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 398-99. 
83 Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 844-45. 
84 Warren Maruyama, Section 301 and the Appearance of Unilateralism, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 394, 397 (1990) 
(calling § 301 the “Schwarzenegger of U.S. Trade Law”). 
85 Wolfgang W. Leirer, Retaliatory Action in United States and European Union Trade Law: A Comparison of 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Council Regulation 2641/84, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 41, 44-5 
(1994) (noting that Europeans were especially upset because nearly one quarter of all section 301 cases had been 
aimed at Europe). 
86 Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 130-31, 134-36. 
87 Alan O. Sykes, “Mandatory Retaliation” for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic 
Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT’L L.J. 301, 324 (1990). 
88 Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 848. 
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 B. The World Trade Organization 
The next major step in the development of international trade regulation was the creation of 
the WTO.  This subpart of the thesis sets forth the history of the WTO and, in particular, the 
improvements made to the process of resolving international trade disputes. 
1. Formation of the WTO 
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which commenced in 1986, was an attempt to 
make the international trade system more efficient.  The procedures that had arisen around the 
GATT were proved unworkable in a number of areas, including dispute resolution, as discussed 
above.  In addition, the GATT failed to cover several important areas of world trade, including 
services and intellectual property.89  The Contracting Parties felt that the time had finally come 
to establish a new international trade organization to integrate and oversee world trade. 
The Uruguay Round resulted in the formation of the WTO, which officially came into 
existence on January 1, 1995.90  The WTO was formed to be more than just the successor to the 
GATT in that it was intended to supersede and encompass the GATT, as well as all the 
subsequent trade negotiations and procedures.  The preamble to the WTO Charter states that the 
participating states are resolved “to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral 
trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past 
trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
                                            
89 WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 8. Moreover, for a variety of reasons, the GATT provisions regarding agriculture 
went largely unheeded by the Contracting Parties. Id. 
90 WTO Charter, supra note 1, art. I; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 380 n.1. 
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 Negotiations.”91  Accompanying the creation of the WTO were a series of renegotiated trade 
agreements, including an updated version of the GATT known as GATT 1994.92 
2. WTO Dispute Resolution 
The system for resolving international trade disputes underwent major changes as a result of 
the Uruguay Round.  The WTO Charter contains the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes93 which provides the proper dispute resolution procedures 
in much greater detail than the GATT.94  The Understanding makes six important modifications 
to the system for resolving trade disputes.  When viewed together, these changes show that the 
new WTO system is much more powerful and authoritative to resolve disputes than the GATT 
system.95 
The first major change was the creation of a single entity, the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB), to oversee all trade disputes.96  As a result, all dispute settlement procedures under the 
GATT, the Subsidies Code, and a variety of other trade-related agreements are now brought 
under the DSB.97  Because the GATT lacked such an overarching commission, there was an 
opportunity for parties to forum-shop for the particular dispute resolution mechanism that best 
                                            
91 WTO Charter, supra note 1, Preamble. 
92 Id. at 1140. 
93 Understanding, supra note 9. 
94 Id. (listing the new WTO procedures in great detail) with GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII (providing merely 
cursory explanation of the GATT procedures). 
95 Schleyer, supra note 8, at 2286. 
96 Understanding, supra note 9, art. 2. The DSB is composed of representatives from every state that has signed the 
treaty or code at issue. Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 848 n.89. 
97 WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 1126. 
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 suited their objectives.98  The formation of the DSB ends the potential for forum-shipping and 
reduces the threat of inconsistent decisions. 
A second modification made by the Understanding is the creation of an appellate procedure.  
In a clear attempt to make the dispute resolution system more consistent, fair, and effective, the 
Understanding gives parties the right to appeal panel decisions to the Appellate Body.99  The 
Appellate Body is a permanent, seven-member trade court that oversees the work of all dispute 
resolution panels, regardless of the treaty or code that is the subject of the dispute.100 
Third, the Understanding repairs a major weakness of the GATT system by making 
adoption of the panel and Appellate Body decisions virtually automatic.  Adoption of a decision 
can only be forestalled if all the member states, including the winning state, agree by consensus 
not to adopt it.101  Under the GATT, the losing party alone could single-handedly derail a panel 
decision by voting against it.  In sharp contrast to the old GATT system, however, a WTO panel 
decision “shall be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) unless a party to the dispute 
formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal to the WTO Appellate Body or the DSB 
decides by consensus not to adopt the report.”102  Also, once the Appellate Body has issued its 
opinion, the decision is binding unless the Dispute Settlement Body votes unanimously to 
overrule it.103  Thus, under the WTO, the winning party can rescue a decision by voting for it.104 
                                            
98 Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 848; Patricia Kalla, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure in the 
1980s: Where Do We Go from Here?, 5 DICK. J. INT’L L. 82, 92 (1986) (noting that former GATT practice involved 
procedures under six disparate dispute mechanisms adopted by nine codes at the Tokyo Round).. 
99 Understanding, supra note 9, art. 17. 
100 Id. art. 17(1)-(2). 
101 Id. arts. 16(4), 17(14). 
102 Id. art. 16(4), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1235. 
103 Id. art. 17(14), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1237 (“An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and 
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 A fourth change made by the Understanding is the imposition of time limits on the process.  
Under the GATT, the dispute resolution system was open-ended and panels often deliberated in 
numerous sessions during a period of months.105  The Understanding imposes strict time limits 
on the disputants,106 the panel,107 the Appellate Body,108 and the DSB109 at every stage of the 
proceedings, and encourages those involved to discharge their duties promptly.110 
Under the GATT system, delays were often attributable to disagreements in the formation of 
the panel.  The consensus requirement “delayed the establishment [of the panel] while the 
parties engaged in meaningless semantic struggles over whether anyone had a right to the 
establishment of a panel and the precise remit of the panel.”111  The Understanding reverses the 
power balance by requiring consensus to delay the formation of a panel once the complaining 
state has requested one.112  Thus, under the WTO system, another delay tactic is eliminated 
since panel formation is virtually automatic. 
Fifth, the Understanding gives teeth to the dispute resolution system by formalizing 
enforcement procedures.113  Under the GATT, the most that the Contracting Parties could do 
                                                                                                                                             
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the 
Appellate Body report . . . .”). 
104 Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 850. 
105 Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 396. 
106 Understanding, supra note 9, arts. 12(5)-(6), 15(1)-(3). 
107 Id. arts. 12(3), 12(8)-(9), 21(5). 
108 Id. art. 17(5). 
109 Id. arts. 20, 21(4). 
110 Id. art. 4(9) (encouraging parties to accelerate proceedings in cases of urgency). 
111 Young, supra note 81, at 402. 
112 Understanding, supra note 9, art. 6(1). 
113 Id. art. 22; see also Young, supra note 81, at 404-05 (noting that under the WTO system, “the offending party is 
eventually told in no uncertain terms that it is to accept all [the WTO's] rulings and decisions”). 
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 was authorize the aggrieved state to retaliate against the violator state.114  A state with sufficient 
political and economic power could easily ignore this retaliation and continue the prohibited 
practices. 115   By adding guiding principles on the means of enforcement, however,  
enforcement under the Understanding can either take the form of compensation for the harm 
caused by the violator state or withdrawal of trade concessions made by the affected state.116 
Finally, the drafters of the Understanding addressed the problem of unilateral retaliatory 
action.  Article 23, entitled “Strengthening of the Multilateral System,” prohibits all members 
from “mak[ing] a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have 
been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has 
been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and 
procedures of this Understanding.”117  This prohibition solidifies the authoritative and exclusive 
position of the WTO in trade dispute resolution.118 
Viewed together, these changes reflect the desire of the WTO member states to remove 
political influences from trade dispute resolution and encourage greater predictability and 
fairness in the application of trade agreements.119 
                                            
114 GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII(2). 
115 This is essentially what happened in the United States-Netherlands dispute of 1953. See supra note 73. 
116 Understanding, supra note 9, art. 22; Young, supra note 81, at 404. 
117 Understanding, supra note 9, art. 23(2)(a). 
118 See Young, supra note 81, at 400-01. 
119 Schleyer, supra note 8, at 2288. 
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III. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
The role of private parties in international dispute resolution has been the subject of debate 
among commentators for many years.  After summarizing the philosophical debate over the 
nature of dispute resolution, this part shows that the WTO dispute resolution system has moved 
from power-oriented dispute resolution toward a rule oriented one.  This part concludes that 
greater private participation in the WTO dispute resolution process is necessary to advance the 
rule-oriented reform of the WTO. 
A. Power vs. Rule 
Since the inception of the GATT, there has been a debate over the appropriate nature of 
international trade regulation and dispute resolution.  Although commentators have expressed a 
wide spectrum of views on this issue, a general distinction can be made between those who 
prefer a “power-oriented” or “pragmatist” approach and those who prefer a “rule-oriented” or 
“legalist” approach.120 
                                            
120 The concepts of power-oriented and rule-oriented diplomacy were first developed by Professor Jackson. See 
John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 98 (1978) 
[hereinafter Jackson, Crumbling Institutions]. The terms “pragmatist” and “legalist” were first used in this context 
by Professor Trimble, see Trimble, supra note 47, at 1017, and later by numerous commentators, e.g., Montana i 
Mora, supra note 29, at 109; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 833. 
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 Pragmatists believe that the goal of international trade dispute resolution should be merely 
to provide a forum for states to resolve disputes among themselves in whichever way they see 
fit.121  They argue that the primary purpose of the dispute resolution system should be to end the 
dispute as soon as possible by encouraging negotiations, consultations, and appropriate political 
compromises.122  Under this view, the system would encourage compromises even if they are in 
contravention of the rules and agreements governing the trade practices in question.123 
The pragmatist view comes from the idea that trade-related diplomacy should be power-
oriented rather than rule-oriented.124  In power-oriented diplomacy, it is the relative power of 
the parties that determines the resolution of the dispute and not any predetermined set of rules.125  
Under this system, “[a] small country would hesitate to challenge a large one on whom its trade 
depends.  Implicit or explicit threats . . . would be a major part of the technique employed.”126 
The legalists, on the other hand, take the view that the goal of trade dispute resolution 
should be to preserve the integrity of the applicable rules.127  The benefit of this approach is that 
it encourages predictability and stability in international trade practices.128  They argue that 
                                            
121 Young, supra note 81, at 390. 
122 OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 71 (1985); Trimble, 
supra note 47, at 1017. 
123 Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 110-11. 
124 Id. at 109. 
125 Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 120, at 98-99. 
126 John H. Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal in the Context of GATT, 
13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 3-4 (1979) [hereinafter Jackson, Governmental Disputes]. 
127 See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 93; Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 120, 
at 99. 
128 Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 129; Trimble, supra note 47, at 1017-18; Young, supra note 81, at 390. 
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 private parties and governments could more adequately “plan economic decisions and thereby 
maximize efficiency” if trade conditions are predictable.129 
In a rule-oriented system, the resolution of a dispute would be based on adherence to a 
prescribed set of rules to which the parties have already agreed.130  Any disagreements that arise 
concerning the application of the rules are resolved by an impartial third party or by some other 
unbiased, predetermined process.131  In contrast to the power- oriented approach, the rule-
oriented approach gives no significance to the relative power of the states in dispute.132 
B. The Trend Toward the Rule-Oriented Approach 
The evolution of world trade dispute resolution in this century represents a shift from a 
power-oriented approach (i.e., pragmatism) to a rule-oriented approach (i.e., legalism).133  The 
two major movements toward a rule-oriented approach have been the Bretton Woods Conference, 
including the subsequent development of the GATT, and the recent creation of the WTO. 
The states participating in the Bretton Woods Conference and the drafters of the GATT were 
trying to create a reliable, integral set of rules that would govern world trade.134  Had the ITO 
come into existence, it would have contained an elaborate dispute resolution system unlike any 
other international dispute resolution system.135  Because the GATT was intended merely as a 
                                            
129 Trimble, supra note 47, at 1017. 
130 Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 120, at 99. 
131 Jackson, Governmental Disputes, supra note 126, at 4. 
132 See Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 120, at 98-99. 
133 Professor Jackson argues more broadly that the entire “history of civilization may be described as a gradual 
evolution from a power oriented approach, in the state of nature, toward a rule oriented approach” and that “modern 
western democracies ... have passed far along the scale toward a rule oriented approach.” Id. at 99. 
134 See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 93. 
135 Id.; Young, supra note 81, at 392-93. 
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 preliminary agreement to regulate world trade until the ITO took over, it did not contain detailed 
dispute resolution provisions.136  In the early years of the GATT, however, the Contracting 
Parties developed procedures, such as the practice of appointing an impartial panel to review the 
dispute and make a recommendation that reflected an acceptance of a rule-oriented approach.137 
The following decades, however, were marked by a breakdown of the dispute resolution 
system and a retreat into power-based diplomacy.138  The birth defects of the GATT began to 
manifest themselves as political influences crept into the dispute resolution process.139  This 
politicization of the system undermined the integrity of the GATT rules and made the power of 
the parties a primary factor in the outcome of trade disputes.140 
One major goal of the Uruguay Round was to improve the increasingly ineffectual dispute 
resolution system by inhibiting the parties’ ability to use their political and economic power to 
circumvent the rules.141  The new dispute resolution system under the WTO represents a major 
shift toward a legalist approach and away from the power-based diplomacy that pervaded the 
GATT system.142 
For example, the creation of the DSB to oversee all disputes accords with the legalist idea 
of an impartial final arbiter.  The addition of an appellate procedure shows that the member 
states were putting more emphasis on the adequacy and quality of rule interpretation and less on 
                                            
136 Young, supra note 81, at 391-92. 
137 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 93; Young, supra note 81, at 393-94. 
138 See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 93; Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 111, 119-20. 
139 JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 93; Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 111, 119-20; 
Young, supra note 81, at 394. 
140 Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 108-09. 
141 Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 845. 
142 Id. at 833; Young, supra note 81, at 391, 399, 406. 
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 the swift resolution of the dispute.  This focus on rule integrity illustrates the member states’ 
strong legalist view.  The provision of strict time limits, the automatic adoption of panel 
decisions, the prohibition of unilateral action, and the heightened enforcement measures limit the 
ability of large states to use their power to delay, derail, or circumvent the dispute resolution 
system.  Taken together, these changes make the WTO dispute resolution system look much 
more like a courtroom than like a negotiating table. 
C. The Advantages of the Rule-Oriented Approach 
This increasing emphasis on adherence to a prescribed set of rules in international trade 
dispute resolution is a desirable trend that should continue in the future.  Perhaps the primary 
benefit of such an approach is that it makes global trade practices more predictable and therefore 
encourages international investment and trade.143  One of the goals of the WTO dispute 
resolution system is to “provid[e] security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system.”144  A power-oriented system, by definition, produces different outcomes based on the 
power balance of the states in dispute.145  The resulting uncertainty would make private parties 
justifiably hesitant to invest their capital and effort into international trade. 
The pragmatists’ emphasis on merely resolving each dispute as quickly as possible146 is too 
shortsighted and would actually lead to more international disputes.  A reliance on the power of 
the respective states encourages large states to use their economic and political power to reap 
                                            
143 See Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 178. 
144 Understanding, supra note 9, art. 3(2). 
145 Young, supra note 81, at 390, 401. 
146 See Long, supra note 122, at 71. 
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 benefits in contravention of the rules.  Such a system would encourage, and maybe even ensure, 
future disputes.147  A rule-oriented approach, on the other hand, encourages adherence to the 
rules, giving strong states no incentive to try to circumvent them.148 
A further benefit of a rule-oriented approach is that it will foster more amicable 
international relations.  A system that relies on a state’s power encourages a state to exercise its 
power.”149  The international acrimony that resulted from the United States’ use of unilateral 
actions in the decades preceding the WTO illustrates the deleterious effects that a power-oriented 
system can have.150 
Indeed, the trend toward rule-oriented approach, both in international trade and in other 
contexts, may be an inevitable result of the global rise of democracy.  As national power shifts 
from entrenched governmental decision-makers to private citizens, the power of states is 
increasingly divided among competing domestic constituencies.151  With a state’s power thus 
decentralized, it can less successfully be used as the primary bargaining chip in international 
relations.  Therefore, a power-oriented approach “becomes more difficult if not impossible.”152 
Of course, the trend toward legalism is not without criticism.  One concern is that a strong, 
rule-based international trade regime will limit states’ ability to structure their own domestic laws.  
                                            
147 David E. Sanger, Europe Postpones Challenge to U.S. on Havana Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at A1. 
(noting that the United States' attempt to resolve this dispute by invoking a “national security exemption” will 
probably lead to future disputes over the use of such an exemption by other states). 
148 See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 112 (“[I]t is not the resolution of the specific dispute 
under consideration which is most important. Rather, it is the efficient and just future functioning of the overall 
system which is the primary goal of a dispute-settlement procedure.”). 
149 Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 120, at 100. 
150 WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 25; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 844-45. 
151 See Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 120, at 100 (describing how the growth of democracy 
“restrict[s] the degree of power and discretion which the Executive possesses”). 
152 Id. at 101. 
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 It has been argued that the domestic laws of every state reflect the political and societal values of 
that state, and that imposing a superseding international law undermines these values in the name 
of free trade.153   This argument, however, overlooks the role that each state’s domestic 
processes played in determining whether that state would enter into the WTO.  The result of the 
Uruguay Round was merely the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.154  To 
obtain the benefits afforded by WTO membership, and the corresponding restraints, states 
needed to approve the Charter through their domestic ratification processes.155  The political 
and societal values already came into play when each state decided to join the WTO.  
Furthermore, the WTO Charter was drafted by governmental representatives who presumably 
tried to infuse their respective national values into the Charter and the trade agreements that 
accompanied it. 
D. The Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Resolution 
Like other dispute settlement systems, the purpose of the WTO dispute resolution system is 
to achieve WTO objectives as a whole.156  The WTO dispute resolution system, therefore, 
cannot be estimated without considering whether it serves to maximize the objectives of the 
                                            
153 Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 2, at 299. Professor Nichols recommends that the WTO adopt an 
exception under which “laws primarily codifying an underlying societal value and only incidentally hindering free 
trade should not be subject to World Trade Organization scrutiny.” Id. at 301. 
154 WTO Charter, supra note 1. 
155 See id. arts. XI, XII, XIII & XIV (referring to the need for member states to “accept” or “accede to” the 
agreement). The United States legislation implementing the WTO Charter is the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 
U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (1994). 
156 Roberts, supra note 12, at 526-26. 
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 WTO.  One of the WTO objectives is the promotion of trade among all states by increasing the 
production of goods and services and the incomes and opportunities of individuals.157   
The movement toward a legal approach in international trade dispute resolution has been 
based on separating political influences and motives from dispute resolution.  A primary benefit 
of such an approach is that it allows private parties to more accurately predict future trade 
conditions, thus allowing them to maximize the value of their resources by participating in 
international trade.  To achieve this objective, private parties should be allowed to participate in 
the dispute resolution system in a manner that will enable them to protect their interests. 
Of course, there are objections that the expansion of standing hurts some constituency of a 
member state, causes unequal treatment between private parties, and most seriously, might cause 
the WTO to be unable to pursue the goal of free trade because states tend to keep their control on 
international trade.158  These objections, however, overlooks the benefits that private party 
participation will bring to the WTO and international trade.  Allowing private parties to bring 
actions against state members, however, would greatly improve the ability of the WTO dispute 
resolution system to serve WTO objectives. 
These objections, however, overlooks the benefits that private party participation will bring 
to the WTO and international trade.  Allowing private parties to bring actions against state 
                                            
157 The Parties to this Agreement, Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and 
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a 
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development, WTO 
Agreement, Preamble. 
158 Philip M. Nichols, Participation Of Nongovernmental Parties In The World Trade Organization: Extension Of 
Standing In World Trade Organization Disputes To Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA J. INT'L ECON. L. 295 (1996). 
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 members, however, would greatly improve the ability of the WTO dispute resolution system to 
serve WTO objectives. 
1. The “Political Capture” Theory 
Private party access to the WTO can prevent the problem of political capture.  The capture 
theory posits an organization run by individuals who try to maximize their own interests instead 
of interests of the organization.159  In the context of a domestic organization, the members 
attempt to maximize a private, rather than public, utility function.160  In the case of the WTO, it 
is run by states which might sacrifice private parties’ interest to maximize their own interests.  
For example, the United States might be hesitant to raise a claim against Japanese import 
restrictions on cars, or even to express negative view of these restrictions because the United 
States must consider its own interest such as diplomacy and international relations.  Thus, so 
long as it is only states that are parties to the WTO, the only interests that can be adequately 
represented and reflected are those of states which may conflict with the objectives of the 
WTO.161  On the other hand, private participation in international organizations can help break 
the cycle of state interest perpetuated by political capture.  In her article addressing individual 
rights in international trade organizations, Andrea Schneider discusses the link between domestic 
politics and international trade:  
                                            
159 Michael Laidhold, Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent Developments in International Trade Dispute 
Resolution Really Give Private Organizations A Voice in the WTO?, 12 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 427, 431, n.17 (Fall 1999). 
(“Take, for example, the hazardous waste industry. High-level EPA regulators and other officials leave government 
positions and find high-level jobs in the same industry that they had been responsible for regulating.”). 
160 HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM, 36 (1989). 
161 Laidhold, supra, note 159, n.19. 
 29 
 
 The involvement of private actors in the dispute resolution mechanisms of trade 
organizations has the ability to reduce the linkage between trade and domestic political 
interests. While theoretically this link allows governments to be more responsive to their 
citizens, in reality, the link between trade and politics keeps governments tethered to 
special and well-organized interest groups. Once a state has determined that it is in its 
national interest to join a trade organization and once rules are adopted under that 
organization, the link to domestic political interests can be reduced by giving private actors 
standing to enforce the agreement. In that way governments will be responsible for 
following the rules across the board rather than selectively.162 
Thus, private participation in the WTO dispute resolution system can help improve state 
accountability to the companies and individuals who conduct international trade.  In contrast, 
the lack of private access to the WTO leads to political capture at the international level.  
Giving private parties the rights to bring cases, rather than requiring them to lobby or petition 
their government to takes action, will eliminate the problems of political capture at the dispute 
resolution stages. 
2. Democracy Deficit 
According to the theory of democracy deficit, as power is centralized in an organization or 
government, and as increasing numbers of laws are passed, individuals have less ability to 
influence the actions of the organization or government.163  At the WTO, the lack of access for 
private parties to dispute resolution mechanisms may be more appropriately termed, “democracy 
absence.”164  Indeed, the lack of any legitimate participation in the WTO holds corporations, 
NGO’s and public interest groups at a great disadvantage in contrast to the ability of states to 
                                            
162 Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in International Trade 
Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 587, 594 (1998). 
163 Id. at 591. 
164 Laidhold, supra note 159, at 432. 
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 influence trade policies.  This problem is compounded at the WTO because the agreements and 
procedures of the WTO have a major impact on the daily operations of the business 
community.165   
Like any organization, the WTO’s continued validity and relevance is dependent on the 
support of those who are intended to benefit - in this case, private parties.166  If private parties 
are denied sufficient access to the dispute resolution system, then the WTO will lose its 
legitimacy as the final arbiter of international trade and its decisions will be rendered 
powerless.167 
Democracy deficit is exacerbated at the WTO in the absence of private party participation.  
Most of the time, and in most states, member governments of the WTO make a concerted effort 
to adequately represent private parties before the WTO.168  In the same way, however, a 
member government to the WTO may choose not to represent any interests other than its own.  
Democracy deficit is problematic both with respect to state accountability and to the conduct of 
international trade among private parties.  A state’s capacity to act at will and subject its trade 
policies to political, rather than economic, environmental and other concerns lessens the 
                                            
165 See Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 162 (describing the profound impact that international treaties in general, 
and GATT specifically, have on individuals and businesses). 
166 See Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. 
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 331, 351 (1996) (arguing that “a closed dispute resolution process will undermine popular 
support”). 
167 See Young, supra note 81, at 408 (“[P]eople are more likely to accept adverse political decisions if those 
decisions are made by political institutions they consider legitimate.”). 
168 South Korea brought an action before the WTO on behalf of South Korean producers of DRAMS (Dynamic 
Random Access Memory chips) including Hyundai Electronics Industries and LG Semicon , See WTO Panel Report, 
United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on DRAMs of One Megabit or Above From Korea, WT/DS99/R.(Jan. 29, 
1999); The United States brought an action before the WTO on behalf of U.S. banana growers including Chiquita 
Brands Int'l, Inc, See EU - Bananas, supra note 20.  
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 effectiveness or applicability of the WTO.169  Those problems can be solved when the WTO 
allows private parties to use its dispute resolution system.170 
3. Transparency 
Transparency is important in international system because “clear rules set forth how the 
system is going to work and create confidence on the part of users of the system.”171  It 
encourages the parties to the dispute to use the system more often by making the rules and 
procedures clear, providing precedent and possible persuasive authority for other dispute 
resolution through published decisions, and increasing the predictability of the system.172  
Through transparency, the international community observes that the result was achieved in a 
just manner.173  A low level of transparency exists if rules and procedures are not well-
established in advance of a dispute.  In that case, “resolution is left up to the parties, and no 
system is set forth.”174  On the other hand, a high level of transparency is achieved when 
procedures and decisions of a system are published regularly to create a high level of 
predictability.175 
                                            
169 Schleyer, supra note 8, at 2294. (“For example, if the United States is in delicate trade negotiations with Japan, 
the United States might be hesitant to raise a claim against Japanese import restrictions on, say, cars, or even to 
express a negative view of these restrictions. If Ford or General Motors can be the instigator or primary proponent of 
the claim, the problem will be addressed without the United States having to take the political heat. Certainly, the 
political complications … would not be so severe or troubling if the claim was raised by a private party instead of 
another government.”). 
170 Id. 
171 Schneider, supra note 162, at 614. 
172 Id. at 613. 
173 Roberts, supra note 12, at 541. 
174 Id. at 615. 
175 Id. at 616. 
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 Although the WTO has made great progress toward achieving predictability and 
transparency through the establishment of the DSU and regularly published decisions, there is 
nevertheless an inherent problem in its transparency potential.176  Transparency includes not 
only the right to be informed, but also the right to inform and participate in the adjudicative 
process.177  “Clearly, both the right to inform and to be informed [and thus to participate in the 
adjudicative process] are both important aspects of transparency.” 178   Therefore, true 
transparency in the WTO cannot be achieved without private participation in the dispute 
resolution system.  By denying private participation in its dispute resolution system, the WTO 
lacks transparency because private parties in the form of individuals, corporations and NGOs can 
never be sure of a position that a state will endorse before the WTO. 
                                            
176 Id. 
177 Laidhold, supra note 159, at 433. 
178 P. Clark & P. Morrison, Key Procedural Issues: Transparency, 32 INT'L LAW. 851, 857 (1998). 
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IV. THE INADEQUACY OF PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
Despite its rule-oriented reform, the WTO has not opened the dispute resolution system to 
private parties, leaving international trade matters in sovereign states and looking at the flow of 
goods as occurring between these states.179  Under the current WTO Dispute Resolution System, 
private actors are involved only to the extent that they lobby their governments to represent their 
interests and to protect their industries.180   Private participation in the WTO dispute resolution 
system is now a little bit broadened by the WTO Appellate Body, which asserted the right of 
member states to include private, non-governmental employees in their trade delegations before 
the WTO,181 and acknowledged the right of private individuals or organizations to submit 
amicus briefs in support of their positions in international trade disputes.182  This part will 
analyze whether the degree of private party participation available at the current WTO dispute 
resolution system is adequate enough for private parties to protect their interests without the 
ability to raise a claim before WTO dispute resolution system. 
                                            
179 R. Bruno, Access of Private Parties to International Dispute Settlement: A Comparative Analysis, 148-49 (1995) 
(unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Harvard University). 
180 For Example, the United State negotiated with Japan to open its automobile market. See Schneider, supra note 
162, at 603. 
181 See EU-Bananas, supra note 20. 
182 See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21, at 15-22 (holding that amicus briefs may now be sent directly to the WTO 
without attachment to members' submissions). 
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 A. Use of Domestic Influence 
Currently, private parties who want to challenge a trade practice of another state must try to 
use their domestic influence to get their government to raise the claim.  The private party can 
persuade its government to raise the claim through informal means such as voting or lobbying.  
In addition, the United States has instituted formal procedures by which citizens can petition the 
government to respond to another state’s trade violation. 
1. Informal Methods 
Where a dispute resolution process is available only to states, private parties can force their 
government to bring their claim to the WTO dispute resolution system by lobbying or using their 
political power.  For example, the real economic actors in the dispute in the mid-1990s between 
the United State and Japan over access to Japan’s market for film products were film 
manufactures Kodak and Fuji.183  Kodak successfully lobbied the U.S. government to raise the 
claim before the WTO and both companies worked side by side with their governments during 
the entire WTO dispute settlement process.184 
Although member governments of the WTO try to adequately represent private parties 
before the WTO, there are many reasons why a state might neglect to raise a valid claim on 
behalf of private parties.  For example, a state “might not want to repeat [a private party’s] point 
if doing so could undermine the government in another WTO case or in domestic litigation.”185  
                                            
183 DUNOFF, supra note 5 at 216. 
184 Id. 
185 Charnovitz, supra note 166, at 353. 
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 In addition, every state has constituents with varying interests, and the government cannot 
possibly represent all of their interests, no matter how well-intentioned and responsive it is.186 
Furthermore, a state’s responsiveness to its constituents will be balanced against its desire to 
maintain amicable relations with its trading partners, especially those with significant political 
and economic power.187  For this reason a state will inevitably bring fewer claims than some of 
its constituents would like.  This political, power-oriented influence on the dispute resolution 
system undermines the WTO’s goals of predictability and stability in world trade. 
Some commentators argue that private standing before the WTO is unnecessary because 
most countries that are important to international trade are responsive to the needs of their 
citizens.188  According to the commentators, “democratic governments do function to fairly 
assess, evaluate, and coordinate various societal values and goals” and that “[t]his is true of trade 
policy as well.”189 
A distinction, however, must be made between the formation of trade policy and the 
effective implementation of policy once it is formed.  With respect to the former, a government 
plays the essential role in balancing societal, political, and economic values.  Dispute resolution, 
however, involves the latter, and a consideration of competing values, as opposed to an emphasis 
on the rules, would undermine the predictability that the WTO seeks to achieve. 
                                            
186 Id. at 342 (noting that “many national governments fail to represent the interests of even a majority of their 
constituencies as periodically reflected by low approval ratings.”). 
187 See Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 901. Professor Shell also notes the “free rider problems” that arise 
in this context. He observes that the benefits of eliminating a prohibited trade practice accrue to all states, while the 
diplomatic fallout is confined to the state that brings the claim. Therefore, states will be hesitant to raise a claim, 
even where doing so would be a net benefit to world trade as a whole. Id. at 901-02. 
188 Trimble, supra note 47, at 1025. 
189 Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 2, at 311-12. 
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 2. Formal Methods: Section 301 
The United States’ section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (“Section 301”) establishes formal 
procedures by which private parties can petition their government to take action in response to 
the alleged trade infractions of another state.190 This procedure could conceivably be used to 
expand private participation in the WTO dispute resolution system, and thus need to be examined 
in closer detail to evaluate its adequacy and feasibility. 
Under Section 301, a citizen may petition the U.S. Trade Representative to take action 
against a foreign state’s trade practices.191  After an investigation, the Trade Representative will 
decide whether the trade practice in question is violating any trade agreement, and, if so, what 
measures should be taken.192  When the United States has retaliated, it has usually been in the 
form of heightened tariffs or other restrictions on imports.193 
Section 301 is clearly power-oriented and has produced all of the negative effects that are 
associated with the use of power-oriented negotiation tactics.  While Section 301 actions have 
been highly successful in the past, they have soured relations between the United States and its 
trading partners and have even inspired retaliation against the United States.194  The animosity 
toward the United States that unilateral measures can produce cautions against continued use of 
Section 301 to resolve trade disputes. 
                                            
190 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994). 
191 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1). 
192 Id. §§ 2411-2420; A. Lynne Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement Under Section 
301: At Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 678-79 (1996). 
193 RICHARD O. CUNNINGHAM & CLINT N. SMITH, SECTION 301 AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, 581, 583. 
194 WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 25; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 844-45. 
 37 
 
 Section 301 does, in an individual case, give private parties some measure of control and 
input into world trade.  This access, however, comes at too high a cost.  The continued use of 
Section 301 would be a reversion to the power-oriented diplomacy of the past and would 
undermine the U.S.-supported efforts of the WTO to make the system fairer and more 
predictable.195 
In addition to being unwise, continued use of Section 301 is also unlikely.  The United 
States government’s liberal use of Section 301 actions was primarily a reaction to the inefficacy 
of the GATT dispute resolution system.196  Now that the system has been improved under the 
WTO, the United States is not as likely to find it necessary to resort to unilateral action under 
Section 301.197 
Another reason why Section 301 is an inadequate method for private parties to protect their 
rights is that there is no guarantee that the U.S. Trade Representative will take action, even if the 
complaint is valid.  The government retains broad discretion at every step of a Section 301 
procedure.198  The same political motivations that could prevent a government from raising the 
claims of its constituents could discourage the United States from actively pursuing a Section 
301 petition. 
                                            
195 See Puckett & Reynolds, supra note 192, at 688-89; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 899. 
196 Puckett & Reynolds, supra note 192, at 687; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 843-44. 
197 Puckett & Reynolds, supra note 192, at 689; TERENCE P. STEWART, THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: 
AN OVERVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES AND POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS, IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, 29, 33 (Terence 
P. Stewart ed., 1996) [hereinafter STEWART, TROUBLE SPOTS]. 
198 CUNNINGHAM & SMITH, supra note 193, at 603-04; see Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution over 
Unilateral Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 233, 246 
n.61 (1996). 
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 The strongest argument against the use of Section 301, however, is that it almost certainly 
would be in violation of the Understanding.  Article 23(2) of the Understanding forbids states 
from taking unilateral action, and even from “mak[ing] a determination to the effect that a 
violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any 
objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute 
settlement.”199  It is hard to envision any explanation for the use of Section 301 that does not 
come into conflict with this prohibition. 
The Understanding’s repudiation of unilateral measures is in conflict, however, with the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (the “URAA”),200 the U.S. statute adopting the WTO Charter.  
The URAA specifically states that Congress did not intend the WTO Charter to invalidate 
Section 301.201  It is difficult to reconcile this provision of the URAA with Article 23.  Such 
discrepancies between domestic laws and the Understanding are covered by Article 16(4) of the 
WTO Charter, which requires each member to “ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.”202  
Based on this provision, it is likely that any continued use of Section 301 will be a violation of 
U.S. obligations under the WTO Charter.203 
                                            
199 Understanding, supra note 9, art. 23(2)(a); see STEWART, TROUBLE SPOTS, supra note 197, at 33-34. 
200 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (1994). 
201 See id. § 3512(a)(2)(B); CUNNINGHAM & SMITH, supra note 193, at 591. 
202 WTO Charter, supra note 1, art. XVI(4). 
203 See STEWART, TROUBLE SPOTS, supra note 197, at 33-34. 
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 B. WTO Appellate Body Decisions regarding Private Party Participation in 
Dispute Resolution 
The WTO Appellate Body has handed down two decisions addressing private access to 
dispute resolution.  In the EU–Bananas case,204 where amongst other things, the Appellate 
Body considered Saint Lucia’s right to be represented by private rather than government counsel.  
The Saint Lucia’s argument was based on the principle of customary international law that a 
sovereign’s right to decide whom it may accredit as officials and members of its delegation 
cannot be limited.  The Appellate Body ruling in the EU-Bananas case permitted government 
representation by private counsel in oral hearings before the Appellate Body. 
Another case to be considered is the United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
Products in 1998, which led the WTO Appellate Body to address the procedural issue of private 
or non-member organization’s submission in briefs in WTO proceedings.205  The Appellate 
Body ruled that attaching a brief or other material to the submission of either appellant or 
appellee, no matter how or where such material may have originated, renders that material at 
least prima facie valid and an integral part of that participant’s submission.  The amicus briefs 
submitted by three groups of NGOs as an appendix to the United States submission, were 
admitted notwithstanding the fact the appended briefs contained legal arguments different from 
those submitted by the United States. 
                                            
204 See EU-Bananas, supra note 20. 
205 See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21. 
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 1. Private Counsel Representation 
The issue of private counsel representation of WTO member governments came to a head 
when the Bananas Panel decided not to admit Christopher Parlin, a private lawyer representing 
Saint Lucia, to the panel proceedings.206  In its first substantive meeting with the parties on 
September 10, 1996, the Panel ruled that the private counsel seeking to represent Saint Lucia was 
not entitled to attend the Panel’s meetings in the case.207 
The Panel ruling with respect to denying representation by private counsel was not 
specifically appealed to the Appellate Body.208  Nevertheless, in July 1997, the government of 
Saint Lucia submitted a letter to the Appellate Body, requesting the participation of its two non-
governmental legal advisers.209   
On July 15, 1997, the Appellate Body granted Saint Lucia’s request.  The Appellate Body 
stated that there was nothing in the WTO agreement, the DSU, the Working Procedures, nor in 
customary international law or the prevailing practice of international tribunals which (1) 
prevents a WTO member from composing its own delegation to an Appellate Body proceeding, 
and (2) specifies who can represent a government in making its representations before the 
Appellate Body.210  The Appellate Body also noted that, in the interest of member governments’ 
representation by qualified counsel in Appellate Body proceedings, “representation by counsel of 
                                            
206 WTO Panel Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) [hereinafter EC - Bananas Panel Report]. 
207 Id. 
208 Id.; See also Understanding, supra note 9, Note that Saint Lucia is a third party to the case and that pursuant to 
Articles 16.4 and 17.4 of the DSU, only parties to a dispute, and not third parties, may appeal a Panel Report. 
209 See EU-Bananas, supra note 20, ¶ 5. 
210 See id. ¶¶ 10, 12. 
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 a government’s own choice may well be a matter of particular significance - especially for 
developing-country Members - to enable them to participate fully in dispute settlement 
proceedings.”211 
The Appellate Body ruling in the EU-Bananas case expressly permits governmental 
representation by private counsel in oral hearings before the Appellate Body.  Although the 
Appellate Body noted that the peculiar legal nature of its own proceedings, which permit the 
participation of private counsel, do not apply as fully at the panel level,212 at least two panel 
decisions since the EU-Bananas case have reportedly allowed private counsel to participate in 
oral hearings.213  Thus, WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have both recognized the futility, 
in the resolution of modern international trade disputes, of maintaining strictly government-
employed delegations.  Therefore, it is now possible for private parties to represent their cases 
before the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body if their governments agree to raise the claim and 
to choose them as the representatives of the governments. 
Private counsel representation would improve the WTO dispute resolution system. First, 
private counsel representation will make the WTO dispute resolution system more legitimate and 
effective by responding to the needs of actual players in international trade.  Because the actual 
parties in interest are the ones most affected by the outcome of the dispute settlement proceeding, 
it makes some sense to allow their counsel to take part in the process.214  Second, private 
                                            
211 See id. ¶ 12. 
212 Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1195, 1205 (1998). 
213 See WTO Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WTO doc. 
WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998) ¶ 4.1. 
214 “[T]he WTO should lead to new areas of practice development for the private bar. U.S. lawyers should 
increasingly assist, lobby and shadow governments as to positions taken in WTO-based disputes ... since such 
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 counsel representation can prevent WTO member governments from sacrificing certain issues for 
the sake of their long-term trade strategy. Finally, private counsel representation can solve 
inequity problem among WTO member governments by helping small countries utilize the WTO 
dispute resolution system. Therefore, contributions that private counsel representation will bring 
to the WTO dispute resolution system cannot be underestimated.  
Permitting private counsel to represent a WTO member government, however, is not 
enough to adequately protect private parties’ interests.  Private counsel representation before the 
DSB is just a reaffirmation of the national sovereignty of WTO members to select their own 
delegates because “it is up to individual government to decide whether to include private sector 
counsel in their delegation to the WTO.”215  Thus, for private parties to have a voice before the 
DSB, their government must agree not only to raise a claim on behalf of the private parties, but 
also to include the private parties in the government’s representatives to the DSB.  As 
mentioned above, however, there are several factors that dissuade WTO member states from 
pursing the interests of private parties before the WTO dispute resolution system.  Private 
parties that are being harmed by illicit trade practices cannot protect their interests if their 
governments, for political reasons, refuse to raise the claims in the first place or to choose private 
sector counsels as the representatives. 
                                                                                                                                             
disputes ultimately affect 'the real parties in interest' - i.e., the lawyers' corporate clients ...” Gregory Shaffer, The 
WTO: The Multilateral Trade Framework for the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 
767, 768 (Oct. 1997). 
215 Jessica C. Pearlman, Participation by Private Counsel in World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
Proceeding, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 399, 414 (Winter, 1999).  
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 2. Private Parties’ Submission of Amicus Briefs to the WTO 
In United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products in 1998, the 
WTO Appellate Body addressed the procedural issue of private or nonmember organizations’ 
submission of briefs in WTO proceedings.216  Despite the absence of mechanisms for private 
party submission of briefs to the WTO, three groups of NGOs submitted briefs to the Panel in the 
Shrimp-Turtle decision in the hopes that their positions would influence the Panel.217  The Panel 
found that the acceptance of non-requested information from non-governmental sources were 
incompatible with the provisions of the DSU.218  Article 13(1) of the DSU provides:  
Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any 
individual or body which it deems appropriate. However, before a panel seeks such 
information or advice from any individual or body within the jurisdiction of a Member it 
shall inform the authorities of that Member. A Member should respond promptly and fully 
to any request by a panel for such information as the panel considers necessary and 
appropriate.219 
The Panel in Shrimp-Turtles interpreted Article 13.2 to mean that additional information is 
appropriately submitted to a Panel only if the Panel expressly solicits it.220 
                                            
216 In the Shrimp-Turtles decision, the WTO Appellate Body upheld an earlier WTO Panel decision that requiring 
the U.S. to bring its import practices with respect to shrimp into conformity with WTO obligations. The Appellate 
Body held that the U.S. Public Law 101-162, Section 609, which prohibited the importation of shrimp caught in nets 
that do not employ turtle-excluder devices, or TED's, was a violation of the introduction, or chapeau, of Article XX, 
See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21. 
217 The three NGO groups were: (1) The World Wide Fund for Nature, and the Foundation for International 
Environmental Law and Development, (2) the Center for International Environmental Law, the Center for Marine 
Conservation, the Environmental Foundation Ltd., the Mangrove Action Project, the Philippine Ecological Network, 
Red Nacional de Accion Ecologica, and Sobrevivencia and (3) the Earth Island Institute, the Humane Society, and 
the Sierra Club. Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21, ¶ 79. 
218 Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21, ¶ 8. 
219 Understanding, supra note 9, art. 13(1). 
220 Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21, ¶ 9. 
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 The Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s interpretation.221  It held that “attaching a brief or 
other material to the submission of either an appellant or appellee, no matter how or where such 
material may have originated, renders that material at least prima facie valid and an integral part 
of that participant’s submission.”222  The Appellate Body admitted the amicus briefs submitted 
by the three groups of NGOs as an appendix to the United States’ submission, although the 
appended briefs contained legal arguments differing from those submitted by the United States. 
Under the Appellate Body holding, a Panel still retains the right to disregard or reject an 
amicus brief filed by a private party unless the amicus brief is adopted by the member state.  
The Panel does not, however, have the right to disregard the brief solely on the grounds that it 
was not submitted by a member.  Thus, WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies retain the right, 
under the decision in the Shrimp-Turtles case, to accept or reject information provided by private 
parties.  Information, in the form of amicus briefs from a private party, may still be submitted to 
a WTO Panel or Appellate Body as an appendix to a member’s submission.  Shrimp-Turtles 
also held that private parties may submit amicus briefs directly to a Panel or the Appellate 
Body.223  If a private party’s amicus brief is expressly adopted by a member to be a part of that 
members’ submission, however, a panel would be under an obligation to consider its 
                                            
221 See id. ¶ 89. 
222 Id. 
223 The language of the Appellate Body decision has been interpreted to imply that any individual or interest group 
can now submit an amicus brief directly to a WTO panel, although the panel would have the discretion to disregard 
it. See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21; see also James Cameron, WTO Opens Disputes to Private Voices, NAT'L L.J., 
Dec. 7, 1998, at B5. 
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 arguments.224  Otherwise, private party access to the WTO, in the absence of a member’s 
endorsement, remains discretionary with the Panel or Appellate Body receiving the information. 
There are many potential advantages that unsolicited amicus brief submissions by private 
parties will bring to the WTO.  As discussed above, a democracy deficit is perpetuated by a 
WTO system that strictly adheres to government-to-government dispute resolution.  One of the 
advantages to private parties’ brief submissions, therefore, is the potential to reduce the amount 
of the democracy deficit in the resolution of international trade disputes.225  This is especially 
true when a member state is reluctant to make an argument on behalf of private parties because 
the private parties can submit directly to the WTO.  Also, allowing a nongovernmental entity to 
make written presentations to WTO panels would lead to better informed, more enlightened 
panel decisions because private interests that may not be represented by the private entity’s state 
may now be heard by the WTO.226  Finally, transparency in dispute settlement is promoted by 
insuring that all arguments in a dispute are considered.  Transparency can be improved if 
corporations and NGOs know that their arguments and positions have a chance to be considered 
during trade disputes.  Increased transparency is thus promoted by a direct avenue for private 
parties’ brief submission to the WTO. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of direct brief submission by private parties, the Shrimp-
Turtles decision is not enough to protect private parties’ interests.227  First, the decision leaves 
                                            
224 See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21, ¶ 89. 
225 Laidhold, supra note 159, at 442. 
226 See Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 908 (arguing that excluding private parties from WTO dispute 
resolution will “silenc[e] them insofar as they might contribute to wiser, more contextual decision-making”). 
227 See Cameron, supra note 223, at B5. 
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 WTO Panels and the Appellate Body with the discretion to accept or reject the arguments 
contained in amicus briefs unless such information is expressly adopted by the member attaching 
the brief.  Thus, private parties’ interests could still be disregarded by the WTO Panels and the 
Appellate Body.  Second, the Shrimp-Turtles decision could lead to aggressive lobbying efforts 
by private organizations to influence a WTO member state in a trade dispute to expressly adopt 
the organization’s arguments.228  Moreover, private organizations may also turn their energies 
toward lobbying other WTO members to join in a trade dispute as a third-party participant.  As 
a third-party participant, a member could effectively represent the legal arguments of an 
organization.  Lobbying efforts conducted by private organizations could become burdensome 
and counterproductive to the point of clogging a member’s ability to represent national interests 
before the WTO.  Third, and most importantly, the private parties’ rights to summit amicus 
briefs comes too late in the process to adequately protect the interests of private parties.  
Nongovernmental entities that are being harmed by illicit trade practices will still be denied relief 
if their governments, for political reasons, refuse to raise a claim in the first place.  Therefore, 
the ability to file amicus briefs provides insufficient protection for private parties engaged in 
international trade. 
                                            
228 Id. 
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V. PRIVATE PARTY STANDING BEFORE THE WTO DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
Once the idea that private participation in the WTO dispute resolution system is desirable is 
accepted, the appropriate level of participation should be determined.  Although the WTO 
Appellate Body decisions have expanded private participation in the WTO dispute resolution 
system, the interests of private parties cannot be adequately protected without allowing private 
parties to raise claims to the WTO.  Thus private party standing to initiate the WTO dispute 
resolution proceeding should be granted.  This part provides a comparative analysis of the 
dispute resolution systems which have been set up and which operate in the context international 
treaties, international organizations, or both, and which grant standing to private parties.  Then, 
this part examines which mechanism is most desirable and workable to the WTO dispute 
resolution system. 
The following forums has been indicated by proponents of private standing before the WTO 
as international dispute settlement mechanisms which provide access and remedy for individuals 
and private entities: the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”),229 the Nordic 
Convention on the Protection of the Environment (the “Nordic Convention”), 230  the 
                                            
229 See Charnovitz, supra note 166, at 349; Young, supra note 81, at 406 & n.77. 
230 Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, Den.-Fin.-Nor.-Swed., 1092 U.N.T.S. 
279 [hereinafter Nordic Convention]. 
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 International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (the “ICSID”);231 the International 
Labor Organization (the “ILO”);232 and the European Convention on Human Rights.233  In 
order to determine the proper threshold for standing before the WTO, it will be helpful to 
examine the methods used by these tribunals. 
A. Use of Domestic Court System 
Nations have provided private parties with the ability to enforce an international agreement 
by expressly linking the rights of individuals to the domestic court systems of the participating 
states.  The two primary examples of this approach are the antidumping and countervailing 
duties provisions of NAFTA234 and the Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, 
which allows private parties to protect their interests in their domestic courts.235  
NAFTA, which came into effect on January 1, 1994, contains dispute resolution provisions 
to serve both states and private parties.236   Chapter XIX of NAFTA creates a binding, 
supranational arbitration scheme accessible directly by private business parties237 through which 
businesses may overturn final anti-dumping and countervailing duty decisions of domestic trade 
regulators.238 NAFTA offers parties who wish to appeal anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
                                            
231 Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 161-62; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 889- 90. 
232 Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 916-17. 
233 Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 161. 
234 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289, arts. 1901-1911, at 682-
87. (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].  
235 Nordic Convention, supra note 230. 
236 See David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 407, 431 (1993). 
237 Both private parties and states have access to this process. NAFTA, supra note 234, art. 1904(5), 32 I.L.M. at 
683. 
238 NAFTA, supra note 234, art. 1904, 32 I.L.M. at 683-84. 
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 decisions issued by national regulatory authorities a choice of appellate procedures.  Aggrieved 
parties may either use the regular domestic system of judicial review of the country that issued 
the decision or request that a binational NAFTA arbitration panel hearS their appeal.239  These 
arbitration panels, which are directed by the treaty to apply the domestic law of the state that 
issued the anti-dumping or countervailing duty decision,240 provide the final decision on such 
allegedly unfair trade claims.241  Even though private parties can raise a claim before a NAFTA 
panel instead of their domestic courts,242 standing is still linked to the domestic laws of the 
importing state.  Specifically, private parties are guaranteed the same right that they possess 
under domestic law to challenge the prohibited activities.243 
Similarly, the Nordic Convention “grants individuals, groups, and non-governmental 
organizations access to a legal system under international law . . . treating such persons as 
members of a community by giving expression to their concerns, interests, and rights.”244  Thus, 
the Nordic Convention gives “[a]ny person who is affected or may be affected by a nuisance 
caused by environmentally harmful activities in another Contracting State” the right to bring suit 
                                            
239 See Id. 
240 If the parties elect to use an article 19 panel, the panel will apply the substantive national law and standard of 
judicial review of the importing state that has issued the contested ruling. Id. art. 1904(2), 32 I.L.M. at 683. Article 
19 panels consist of five arbitrators, a majority of whom must be lawyers. Id. Annex 1901.2(2), 32 I.L.M. at 687. 
241 NAFTA provides that panel decisions may be appealed by states, id. art. 1904(13), 32 I.L.M. at 683, to three-
member “Extraordinary Review Committees,” id. Annex 1904.13(1), 32 I.L.M. at 688, which may reverse a panel 
decision only if an arbitrator is guilty of “gross misconduct, bias, or serious conflict of interest,” if the panel 
“seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure,” or if the panel “manifestly exceeded its powers,” and 
only if such wrongful conduct “materially affected the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the binational 
review process,” id. art. 1904(13), 32 I.L.M. at 683.  
242 NAFTA, supra note 234, art. 1904(5), at 683; see Samuel C. Straight, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective 
Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, 232 (1995). This applies only to 
antidumping disputes.  In all other areas, only countries can initiate the dispute settlement process. NAFTA, supra 
note 234, art. 2004, at 694. 
243 NAFTA, supra note 234, art. 1904(5), at 683; see Straight, supra note 242, at 232. 
244 Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community, and International Law, 30 HARV. INT’L L.J. 393, 414 (1989). 
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 in the offending state’s courts.245  Under this arrangement, there is no separate international 
tribunal, but merely an agreement that each state will entertain suits from nationals of other 
countries to the same extent that they allow suits from their own citizens. 
The use of domestic courts in international arena, however, is not only detrimental to the 
interests of private parties,246 but also unworkable and undesirable for the WTO dispute 
resolution system.  NAFTA and the Nordic Convention include only three or four countries and 
only apply to a specific area of the law.  In such a context, the danger of inconsistent application 
of the law, while not totally absent, is much less significant than it would be in the WTO, which 
covers over a hundred different countries247 and regulates a broad spectrum of trade practices.  
If a similar mechanism was used for the WTO, the domestic courts of dozens of states would be 
simultaneously interpreting and applying WTO agreements.  The resulting lack of uniformity in 
the application of trade laws would undermine the ability of private parties to reliably anticipate 
future trade practices.  One major improvement of the WTO dispute resolution system over the 
GATT was the elimination of multiple forums for resolving disputes.  A system that ties private-
party standing to the domestic laws of each state would negate this benefit.  Moreover, allowing 
each state’s domestic law to define the standing requirements for the WTO would cause private 
access to be susceptible to politically-motivated limitations because each state could limit private 
party participation by limiting domestic judicial review of international trade decisions. 
                                            
245 Nordic Convention, supra note 230, art. 3, at 296; see Christopher D. Stone, Locale and Legitimacy in 
International Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1279, 1283 (1996). 
246 There are practical obstacles to invoking the power of domestic courts to adjudicate international disputes. 
Courts are extremely hesitant to extend jurisdiction over the field of international relations and there are both 
statutory and judicial limitations on suits against foreign states, Schleyer, supra note 8, at 2301-02. 
247 See The Understanding the WTO: The Orgianzation Members and Observers available at 
<http://www.wto.org/wto/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm>. 
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 B. Private Party Standing to the Equity Holders 
The ICSID and the ILO both provide some nongovernmental entities with standing to 
initiate disputes.  Upon closer inspection, however, the nature of these entities serves to limit 
standing in a way that renders them inapposite to the WTO. 
Unlike the WTO, which is an organization of states, the ICSID deals with international 
investment between private foreign investors and governments.  As a forum of international 
dispute resolution, however, the ICSID acknowledges all actors operating within its system.  
Despite its structural difference from the WTO, the ICSID dispute resolution is worth of 
comparison to the WTO dispute resolution system in that it applies equally applies to all parties 
who participate in the field of international investment.248 
The ICSID, established through the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 249 is a legal framework that protects and 
promotes the flow of foreign investment between developed and developing countries.250  
Unlike the WTO, the ICSID permits private parties to participate with states in settling disputes 
and making policy.  Once parties consent to arbitration under the ICSID Convention , the 
ICSID permits private parties to sue states and obtain binding arbitration awards that the 
domestic courts of the defendant states are obligated to enforce.251  The ICSID’s jurisdiction 
                                            
248 Laidhold, supra note 159, at 444. 
249 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 
1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; Malcolm D. Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving 
the Investment Climate of Developing Countries: The Cases of ICSID and MIGA, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 103, 106 
(1992). 
250 Bruno, supra note 179, at 79. 
251 Shell, Trade Stakeholders Model, supra note 17, at 372. 
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 extends to “disputes between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State 
arising directly out of an investment-related agreement, provided both parties have consented in 
writing to submit such a dispute to the Centre.”252  Therefore, the ICSID provides a neutral 
forum for arbitrating investment disputes between foreign investors and host countries.253   
The ICSID, however, grants an investor a right to arbitration only if the initial investment 
agreement between the investor and the host country explicitly provides for ICSID arbitration.254  
Essentially, states are in no way compelled to use ICSID arbitration.255  Furthermore, the ICSID 
Convention allows states to remove entire classes of disputes from ICSID jurisdiction.256  Thus, 
the ICSID does not raise serious standing concerns in that a state must expressly grant an 
investor permission to sue the state.  Such a system would be unworkable in the context of the 
WTO.  Requiring states to explicitly consent to suit before the WTO for each individual case 
would lead to inequitable enforcement of trade agreements.  Larger states could use their 
political and economic power to refuse to consent, while less developed states would be 
effectively forced to consent in order to attract more capital.257  This power-based outcome 
would gradually weaken the predictability that the WTO has sought to achieve. 
                                            
252 Rowat, supra note 249, at 109. “Investment” in the ICSID context has rendered “jurisdiction over a wide range 
of activities, including construction contracts, licensing, and concession agreements, as well as purely manufacturing 
activities.” Id. 
253 ICSID Convention, supra note 249, art. 1, at 162; Rowat, supra note 248, at 107. 
254 ICSID Convention, supra note 249, art. 25, at 174. 
255 Rowat, supra note 249, at 108. 
256 Id. 
257 This imbalance is less problematic in the ICSID context because the ICSID was established for the specific 
purpose of “reduc[ing] the political risks constraining increased foreign direct investment” in less developed 
countries. Id. at 105. 
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 The ILO is the primary international organization concerned with protecting the rights of 
workers around the world.258  Its primary function is to establish labor standards and monitor 
international compliance with these standards. 259   Under the ILO Constitution, workers’ 
organizations can raise “representations of non- observance” against states alleged to be in 
violation of the required labor standards.260  Individual workers cannot bring complaints, and a 
complaint from a workers’ organization is only considered if this organization is deemed by the 
ILO to be authentic.261 
The approach taken by the ILO dispute resolution system is inapplicable to the WTO.  
Extending standing to workers’ organizations is not as drastic as extending it to individuals and 
corporations.  Also, workers’ organizations will be subject to the same political influences that 
states are and may be hesitant to file some claims in order to protect their relationship with the 
offending state.  In order for private parties to adequately protect their interest in free trade with 
a minimum of political interference, the WTO needs to make standing available at the individual 
level, not the organizational level. 
C. Private Party Standing to the Entity that Suffers Harm 
The harm of a state’s protectionist trade practices is borne by the private parties which are 
doing business with that state.  In order for these private parties to be confident that illicit trade 
                                            
258 Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to Enforce Violations of Forced 
and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361, 381 (1995). 
259 Id. at 381-82. 
260 International Labour Office, Constitution of the International Labour Organisation and Standing Orders of the 
International Labour Conference, art. 24; see Ehrenberg, supra note 258, at 385-86. 
261 See Ehrenberg, supra note 258, at 407. The authenticity of a workers' organization depends on “several factors, 
including the organization's charter and bylaws, membership, and history.” Id. 
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 practices will be corrected with sufficient speed and reliability, the WTO dispute resolution 
system needs to be available to them.  In other areas of international law, private parties have 
standing to raise claims before international tribunals when they have suffered prospective or 
actual harm.  An analysis of the various standing levels of these tribunals will be helpful in 
determining the proper standing levels for the WTO. 
1. Standing for Prospective Harm 
The European Convention on Human Rights262 allows standing for private parties who 
have not suffered actual harm, but for whom injury is imminent or prospective.   The European 
Convention on Human Rights, which most European states have ratified, contains certain 
guarantees of basic human rights.  An individual who has been a victim of a violation of these 
rights can file a claim with the European Commission of Human Rights.263  In order to sue, the 
individual must have been directly affected by the violation.264  For the purposes of standing, 
the Commission has expanded the definition of “victim” to include a potential or eventual 
victim.265 
In the context of the WTO, allowing private parties to raise claims for prospective injuries 
would be too broad.  Such a standard would allow everyone who could potentially do business 
in a state to attack that state’s trade practices.  Standing for prospective injury is possible for the 
                                            
262 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter European Convention]. 
263 Id. art. 25, at 236-38. 
264 See Richard Desgagné, Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights, 89 
AM. J. INT'L L. 263, 284 (1995). 
265 Id. at 284-85. 
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 European Union because the states of the European Union has given up much more of their 
autonomy than the states of the world would be willing to give up to the WTO.266  It is clear 
that a similar standard for the WTO would represent a serious intrusion into the autonomy of the 
WTO member states.  Moreover, human rights violation should be treated differently from the 
violation of trade agreements.  Human rights violation will normally be irreversible; in contrast, 
economic harm, such as that resulting from restrictive trade practices, is rectifiable, so there is no 
danger in requiring private parties to actually suffer harm before raising a claim before the 
WTO.267 
2. Standing Limited to Those Actually Harmed 
Standing for private parties, therefore, should be limited to those who have suffered actual 
harm due to a state’s allegedly illicit trade practices.  This standard is used in the dispute 
resolution system provided in the investment provisions of NAFTA. 
Chapter XI of NAFTA provides guidelines to ensure fair treatment of foreign investors.268  
If a state-sanctioned monopoly or state enterprise acts in contravention of chapter XI, then 
foreign investors can force the offending state into arbitration.269  An investor has standing to 
raise a claim only if the investor has actually incurred some form of loss or damage by reason of 
the alleged breach.270  It is clear that this will not be interpreted to encompass prospective loss 
                                            
266 Schleyer, supra note 8, at 2308. 
267 Id. 
268 See NAFTA, supra note 234, arts. 1101-1139, at 639-48. 
269 Id. art. 1116(1), at 642-43; see Charnovitz, supra note 166, at 349. 
270 NAFTA, supra note 234, art. 1116(1), at 642-43. 
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 or damage because the statute of limitations for filing a complaint starts when the investor knows 
or should have known that the loss occurred.271 
This same standard should be adopted by the WTO as the threshold for private-party claims. 
Allowing private parties to bring actions against state members would greatly improve the ability 
of the WTO dispute resolution system to fulfill WTO objectives.  Standing, however, should be 
limited to those who have suffered economic loss as a result of behavior by state members 
contrary to the standards set under the WTO agreements.  This standard would permit private 
parties to challenge trade practices that are actually inhibiting free trade, while keeping frivolous 
claims from the WTO dispute resolution system.  Also, it ensures that the parties will be 
diligent in pursuing their claims. 
                                            
271 Id. art. 1116(2), at 643. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
An international system that includes state, corporate, organizational and individual actors 
and that relies solely on states to bring and enforce the laws of the treaty has a legitimacy 
problem.  It is especially true in the context of international trade where private individuals 
rather than states are the primary actors. 
Notwithstanding the rule-oriented reform of the WTO, there are many improvements that 
can be made to the WTO dispute resolution system so that dispute resolution adequately 
accomplishes the goals set forth for the treaty.  The WTO system is imperfect because of the 
large gap between state and private interests.  The lack of standing for private parties to bring 
suit before the WTO means that either there are many potential international trade dispute claims 
that are never resolved, or private interests already before the WTO are not heard. 
Private counsel representation and submission of amicus brief by private parties 
acknowledge that WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies are realizing the efficacy of private 
interests in international trade matters.  In the context of private counsel representation, the 
WTO acknowledges both the sovereignty of member states and the importance of stretching 
trade representation beyond national boundaries.  In the context of private parties’ brief 
submissions, the WTO has recognized the value of non-state arguments in trade disputes.  The 
WTO has even permitted private parties’ brief submission directly to a WTO Panel or Appellate 
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 Body.  WTO tribunals nevertheless retain the power to accept or reject any or all private parties’ 
arguments that are not expressly adopted by a member state. 
These changes, however, are not sufficient for private parties to protect their interests unless 
the ability to initiate dispute before the WTO is granted to private parties without the aid of a 
member state.  As long as private parties have to rely on their governments to initiate and 
advance trade disputes, they will be uncertain about the future enforcement of trade agreements 
and will therefore be hesitant to take full advantage of the benefits of free trade. 
It is true that there must be structural changes to the WTO dispute resolution system for 
private parties to have a voice at the WTO.272  It is also true, however, that if states are actually 
committed to the trade treaties and to bringing the benefits of those treaties to their constituents, 
they must allow their own citizens to bring cases directly to the dispute resolution mechanism 
established under the treaty.  Among many available ways of private participation in the WTO 
dispute resolution system, granting private parties standing before the WTO is the only way for 
private parties to protect their interests and for the WTO to fulfill its objectives.  Standing, 
however, should be strictly limited to those parties that have suffered actual harm to reduce the 
number of frivolous suits and ensure diligence of the parties in pursuing their claims. 
                                            
272 Laidhold, supra note 159, at 450. 
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